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Summary 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force on January 1, 1994, 
establishing a free trade area as part of a comprehensive economic and trade agreement among 
the United States, Canada, and Mexico. President Trump has repeatedly stated that he intends to 
either renegotiate or withdraw from NAFTA. In May 2017, the U.S. Trade Representative 
(USTR) formally notified Congress of the Administration’s intent to renegotiate NAFTA. 
Reactions to the announcement have been mixed, with some industries supporting NAFTA 
“modernization” as a way to address a range of trade concerns, while others are urging the need 
to proceed more cautiously so as to not destabilize current U.S. export markets. 
Canada and Mexico are key U.S. agricultural trading partners. Since NAFTA was implemented, 
the value of U.S. agricultural trade with its NAFTA partners has increased sharply. Agricultural 
exports rose from $8.7 billion in 1992 to $38.1 billion in 2016, while imports rose from $6.5 
billion to $44.5 billion. As a share of U.S. agricultural trade, Canada and Mexico rank second and 
third (after China) as leading U.S. export markets. Leading NAFTA-traded agricultural products 
were meat and dairy products; grains; fruits, tree nuts, and vegetables; oilseeds; and sweeteners. 
In general, NAFTA is considered to have benefitted the United States both economically and 
strategically in terms of North American relations. Many U.S. food and agricultural industry 
groups claim that NAFTA has been positive for their industries. As part of its 2015 retrospective 
analysis of the impacts of NAFTA, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) concluded in a 
2015 report that “NAFTA has had a profound effect on many aspects of North American 
agriculture over the past two decades,” contributing to increased market integration and cross-
border investment and resulting in “important changes in consumption and production.”  
Although NAFTA resulted in tariff elimination for most agricultural products and redefined 
import quotas for some commodities as tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), some products—such as U.S. 
exports to Canada of dairy and poultry products—are still subject to high above-quota tariffs. In 
addition to tariffs and quotas, NAFTA addressed sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and 
other types of non-tariff barriers that may limit agricultural trade. SPS regulations are often 
regarded by agricultural exporters as one of the greatest challenges in trade, often resulting in 
increased costs and product loss and disrupting integrated supply chains.  
Renegotiating NAFTA could provide an opportunity to “modernize” certain issues affecting U.S. 
agricultural exporters. Potential options could include:  
 Improving agricultural market access. Liberalize remaining dutiable 
agricultural products that are still subject to TRQs and high out-of-quota tariff 
rates.  
 Updating NAFTA’s SPS provisions. Address SPS concerns in agricultural trade 
by “going beyond” existing World Trade Organization (WTO) rights and 
obligations by addressing certain requirements including risk assessment, 
transparency, and notification, as well as building in additional rapid response 
mechanism and enforcement.  
 Addressing other trade concerns. Address concerns raised in outstanding 
disputes between the United States and its NAFTA partners, as well as 
geographical indications (GIs) or place names that identify products based on 
their reputation or origin.  
A number of these types of trade concerns were addressed in recent U.S. trade negotiations under 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, and some farm interest groups claim that the TPP 
could provide a blueprint for NAFTA renegotiations involving U.S. agricultural trade concerns. 
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he North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force on January 1, 1994 
(P.L. 103-182), establishing a free trade area as part of a comprehensive economic and free 
trade agreement among the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Although some industries 
may have reduced their U.S. operations, in general, NAFTA is considered to have benefitted the 
United States economically as well as strategically in terms of North American relations.1 The 
U.S. food and agricultural sectors, which is the focus of this report, has benefitting especially 
from NAFTA. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and many agricultural industry 
groups claim that NAFTA has positively affected U.S. agricultural markets. NAFTA continues to 
be of interest to Congress given continued strong trilateral trade and investment ties and the 
agreement’s significance for U.S. trade policy.  
President Trump has repeatedly stated that he intends to either renegotiate or withdraw from 
NAFTA. In May 2017, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) notified Congress of the 
Administration’s intent to renegotiate NAFTA.2 USTR is scheduled to conduct a public hearing in 
late June 2017 and also requested public comment on “matters relevant to the modernization” of 
NAFTA.3 In response to congressional concerns that NAFTA’s renegotiation could be 
“unsettling” to the U.S. agricultural community, the Administration has assured Congress that it 
will “do no harm” to existing U.S. agricultural export markets and will prioritize U.S. agricultural 
exports in the renegotiation.4  
It is significant that all three NAFTA countries participated in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
agreement from which the United States withdrew in January 2017, because TPP represented the 
most recent attempt to design a modern regional free trade agreement (FTA).5 I 
For more background information on NAFTA and the current status of the Administration’s 
activities, see CRS Report R42965, The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and 
CRS In Focus IF10047, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
NAFTA’s Agriculture Provisions 
NAFTA’s primary objectives were “to eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-border 
movement of goods and services” among the NAFTA countries. NAFTA’s market access 
provisions were structured as three separate bilateral agreements. The first agreement, the 
Canada-United States Trade Agreement (CUSTA), took effect on January 1, 1989, and was later 
subsumed into NAFTA and included certain additional provisions. The second and third 
agreements are both under NAFTA—one between Mexico and the United States and another 
between Canada and Mexico. These latter agreements took effect on January 1, 1994.  
                                                 
1 See, for example, U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), Economic Impact of Trade Agreements Implemented 
Under Trade Authorities Procedures, Pub. No. 4614, Inv. No. 332-555, June 2016; and S. Zahniser et al., NAFTA at 
20: North America’s Free-Trade Area and Its Impact on Agriculture, WRS-15-01, February 2015. 
2 Letter to top legislators in both congressional chambers from USTR Robert Lighthizer, May 18, 2017. See also CRS 
Insight IN10706, North American Free Trade Agreement: Notification for Renegotiation.  
3 82 Federal Register 98: 23699, May 23, 2017 (Docket Number USTR-2017-0006). 
4 Comments by USTR Lighthizer during a joint press conference with House Agriculture Committee Chairman K. 
Michael Conaway and USDA Secretary Sonny Perdue, May 24, 2017. See Inside U.S. Trade, “Lighthizer to Perdue, 
Lawmakers: Agriculture ‘Will Be Front and Center’ in Every Trade Deal,” May 24, 2017. 
5 Office of the White House, “Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement,” January 23, 2017. See also CRS Insight IN10646, The United States 
Withdraws from the TPP. TPP would have established a free trade agreement between the United States and 11 Asian 
and Pacific-facing nations. 
T 
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For agriculture, NAFTA (including CUSTA) eliminated tariffs and addressed other types of non-
tariff barriers to trade, such as quotas, licenses, and other types of restrictions and standards. 
NAFTA’s agricultural provisions are contained within the “Agriculture and Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures” chapter (Chapter 7), but provisions in other chapters also apply. The 
text box provides a summary of NAFTA’s provisions that address agricultural trade. 
Agricultural Trade Liberalization Under NAFTA 
 Tariff and quota elimination. Eliminated some trade restrictions immediately, while others were phased out 
over either a 4-, 9-, or 14-year period (see Table 1). Redefined some import quotas as tariff equivalents or tariff 
rate quotas (TRQs). Canada was able to exempt its agriculture supply management system for its dairy products, 
poultry, and eggs. 
 Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. Imposed specific disciplines on the development, adoption, 
and enforcement of SPS measures (which some consider to have established the blueprint for the World Trade 
Organization’s SPS Agreement). Established a Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, which also 
hosts a number of technical working groups to enhance regulatory cooperation and facilitate trade. 
 Rules of origin. Established that products from non-NAFTA countries do not qualify for NAFTA tariff 
reductions even if shipped through a NAFTA country. 
 Treatment of foreign investors. Established provisions designed to facilitate foreign investment, including 
equal treatment of foreign and domestic investors and prohibition of certain performance standards, such as 
minimum domestic content requirements in production. 
 Formal dispute resolution mechanism. Created a formal mechanism for resolving disputes regarding the 
agreement’s provisions for investment (Chapter 11) and services (Chapter 14), antidumping and countervailing 
duty determinations (Chapter 19), and also general interpretation and application of the agreement (Chapter 20). 
For agricultural disputes, mostly Chapters 19 and 20 apply. 
 Export subsidies. Prohibited export subsidies in Canada-U.S. agricultural trade (although export subsidies are 
permitted with regard to U.S.-Mexico trade). 
 Domestic agricultural policies and subsidies. CUSTA and NAFTA did not address domestic subsidies, 
which were determined to be best addressed by formal multilateral negotiations. However, the NAFTA partners 
agreed to move toward domestic support policies that are minimize distortion trade or production.  
 Grade and quality standards. The United States and Mexico agreed that when either country applies 
marketing, grade, or quality standards to a domestic product destined for processing, it will provide no less 
favorable treatment for like products imported for processing.  
Source: CRS from NAFTA’s Chapter 7 (Agriculture and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures) and other chapters. 
Based also on compilations by USDA, “NAFTA,” January 2008, S. Zahniser et al., NAFTA at 20: North America’s Free-
Trade Area and Its Impact on Agriculture, WRS-15-01, February 2015; and M. N. Gifford, “Agricultural Trade 
Liberalization Under NAFTA: The Negotiation Process,” in R. M. A. Lyons et al. (eds.), Trade Liberalization Under 
NAFTA: Report Card On Agriculture, Proceedings of the 6th Agricultural and Food Policy Systems Information Workshop, 
January 2001.  
Tariff and Quota Elimination 
For agriculture, certain restrictions on bilateral trade were eliminated immediately upon 
implementation, while other restrictions were phased out over either a period of 4-, 9-, or 14-
years (Table 1). Sensitive products, such as sugar, were given the longest phase-out period. 
Tariff elimination for agricultural products under CUSTA concluded on January 1, 1998. 
However, quotas for certain agricultural products in U.S.-Canada trade were not liberalized. This 
was carried over without change into NAFTA. In the World Trade Organization (WTO) Uruguay 
Round, all import quotas were converted to tariff-rate quotas (TRQs).6 Accordingly, within-quota 
                                                 
6 TRQs allow imports of fixed quantities of a product either duty-free or at a lower tariff. Once the quota is filled, a 
higher tariff is applied on additional imports. 
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trade occurs at the duty-free tariff treatment agreed to in CUSTA, but the over-quota trade occurs 
at the WTO bound tariff equivalent of the old quota, which is not liberalized. Because Canada 
was able to exclude dairy products, poultry, and poultry products (including eggs) from tariff 
elimination in NAFTA, Canada is able to maintain a supply management system for these sectors 
by limiting imports through restrictive TRQs.7 These products were also exempt from Canada-
Mexico trade liberalization. 
Table 1. NAFTA Tariff Chronology, Selected Agricultural Commodities 
1989 Canada-United States Trade Agreement (CUSTA) implemented 
January 
1994 
NAFTA commencement 
 U.S. tariffs eliminated for Mexican corn, sorghum, barley, soymeal, pears, peaches, oranges, fresh strawberries, 
beef, pork, poultry, most tree nuts, carrots 
 Mexican tariffs eliminated for U.S. sorghum, fresh strawberries, oranges, other citrus, carrots, most tree nuts 
January 
1998 
Completion of nine-year transition period associated with CUSTA between Canada and the United States 
 Remaining Canadian-U.S. tariffs eliminated (except for certain exempted products, such as dairy, poultry, and 
eggs) 
 U.S. tariffs eliminated for Mexican non-durum wheat, soyoil, cotton, oranges 
 Mexican tariffs eliminated for U.S. pears, plums, apricots, cotton 
January 
2003 
Completion of nine-year transition period under NAFTA between Mexico and the United States 
 U.S. tariffs eliminated for Mexican durum wheat, rice, dairy, winter vegetables, frozen strawberries, fresh 
tomatoes 
 Mexican tariffs eliminated for U.S. wheat, barley, soybean meal and soyoil, rice, dairy products, poultry, hogs, 
pork, cotton, tobacco, peaches, apples, oranges, frozen strawberries, fresh tomatoes 
January 
2008 
Completion of 14-year transition period under NAFTA between Mexico and the United States 
 U.S. tariffs eliminated for Mexican frozen concentrated orange juice, winter vegetables, peanuts 
 Mexican tariffs eliminated for U.S. corn, sugar, dried beans, milk powder 
Source: S. Zahniser and J. Link, Effects of North American Free Trade Agreement on Agriculture and the Rural 
Economy, USDA Economic Research Service, WRS-02-1, July 2002; and H. Brunke and D. A. Sumner, “Role of 
NAFTA in California Agriculture: A Brief Review,” University of California, AIC Issues Brief# 21, February 2003. 
Tariff elimination for agricultural products under NAFTA concluded on January 1, 2008. Most 
non-tariff trade barriers in U.S.-Mexico agricultural trade were converted to either tariffs or 
TRQs. Prior to NAFTA, Mexico’s trade-weighted tariff on U.S. products averaged about 11%. 
Tariffs for some agricultural products were higher, such as Mexican tariffs for fruits and 
vegetables, which averaged about 20% before NAFTA.8 Also prior to NAFTA, certain 
agricultural products—wheat, tobacco, cheese, evaporated milk, grapes, corn, dry beans, poultry, 
barley/malt, animal fats, potatoes and eggs—were subject to Mexican import licensing 
                                                 
7 For more information on Canada’s supply management system for dairy, see CRS Insight IN10692, New Canadian 
Dairy Pricing Regime Proves Disruptive for U.S. Milk Producers. Canada’s system of supply management restricts the 
availability of domestic and imported dairy, poultry and egg products in order to achieve higher returns for Canadian 
producers and provide greater price stability for consumers by providing production price supports, limiting domestic 
output, and imposing tariff-rate quotas on imports. 
8 Liberalization of Mexico’s licensing requirements on U.S. imports largely began before NAFTA was negotiated. 
Previously Mexican fruit and vegetable average tariffs were about 50%. 
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requirements affecting a reported 25% of the value of U.S. agricultural exports.9 Mexico also 
applied certain “official import prices,” an arbitrary customs valuation system that raised duty 
assessments. In the United States, marketing orders that are administered by USDA designed to 
set national guidelines for product quality have affected imports of some Mexican products such 
as tomatoes, onions, avocados, grapefruit, oranges, olives, and table grapes. 
U.S. agricultural imports subject to reduced TRQ under NAFTA include sugar, beef, dairy 
products, peanut butter and paste, cotton, apparel, and cotton (from Canada) and beef, apparel, 
fabric, and yarn (from Mexico).10 
SPS Measures and Other Non-Tariff Barriers 
In addition to tariffs and quotas, NAFTA addressed SPS measures and other types of non-tariff 
barriers that may limit agricultural trade. NAFTA requires that SPS measures be scientifically 
based, nondiscriminatory, and transparent and minimally affect trade.  
SPS measures are laws, regulations, standards, and procedures that governments employ as 
“necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health” from the risks associated with the 
spread of pests, diseases, or disease-carrying and causing organisms or from additives, toxins, or 
contaminants in food, beverages, or feedstuffs.11 For agricultural exporters, SPS regulations are 
often regarded as one of the greatest challenges in trade, often resulting in increased costs and 
product loss and also the potential to disrupt integrated supply chains.12 A related issue involves 
technical barriers to trade (TBT). TBTs cover both food and non-food traded products. TBTs in 
agriculture include SPS measures and other types of measures related to health and quality 
standards, testing, registration, certification requirements, and packaging and labeling 
regulations.13 For more background information, see text box. 
Although NAFTA entered into force before the WTO was established and the WTO’s Agreement 
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”) was implemented, it contains a 
detailed SPS chapter and imposes specific disciplines on the development, adoption, and 
enforcement of SPS measures.14 Some consider NAFTA’s SPS provisions as establishing the 
blueprint for the SPS Agreement.15 Similar to the SPS Agreement, NAFTA’s SPS disciplines are 
designed to prevent the use of SPS measures as disguised trade restrictions. SPS measures should 
also be scientifically based and consistent with international and regional standards while at the 
same time explicitly recognizing each country’s right to determine its appropriate level of 
                                                 
9 S. Zahniser and J. Link, Effects of North American Free Trade Agreement on Agriculture and the Rural Economy, 
USDA Economic Research Service, WRS-02-1, July 2002. 
10 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), https://www.cbp.gov/trade/nafta. For additional background see CBP’s 
customs procedures for agricultural products imported under NAFTA (https://www.cbp.gov/trade/nafta/guide-customs-
procedures/provisions-specific-sectors/agricultural-products). 
11 Examples include product standards, requirements for products to be produced in disease-free areas, quarantine and 
inspection procedures, sampling and testing requirements, residue limits for pesticides and drugs in foods, and limits on 
food additives. 
12 See, for example, S. Morris, “SPS and TBT Plus: Building upon the WTO in Dependable Ways,” USDEC, May 23, 
2017. 
13 Examples include process and product standards; technical regulations; product environmental regulations; voluntary 
procedures relating to health, sanitation, and animal welfare; inspection procedures; product specifications; and 
approval and marketing of biotechnology. 
14 NAFTA, Chapter Seven, Section B (Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures). 
15 Gifford, “Agricultural Trade Liberalization Under NAFTA,” pp. 6-11. 
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protection (e.g., to protect consumers from unsafe products or to protect domestic crops and 
livestock from the introduction of foreign pests and diseases).16  
NAFTA also established a Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures to facilitate 
technical cooperation in the development, application, and enforcement involving SPS measures. 
The committee meets periodically to review and resolve SPS issues and also hosts a number of 
technical working groups to enhance regulatory cooperation and facilitate trade between the 
NAFTA countries. Working groups address, for example, national regulatory and scientific review 
capacity, as well as coordination and harmonization of pesticide standards among the NAFTA 
partner countries. 
SPS and TBT Measures in the WTO 
NAFTA’s entered into force before the WTO was established and the SPS Agreement was implemented. It contains a 
detailed SPS chapter that some consider provided the blueprint for the SPS Agreement. SPS measures regarding food 
safety and related public health protection are addressed in the SPS Agreement, which established enforceable 
multilateral disciplines on SPS measures. The SPS Agreement entered into force in 1995 as part of the establishment 
of the WTO. Trade rules regarding TBTs are spelled out in the WTO’s Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
which also entered into force in 1995.  
In general, under the SPS Agreement, WTO members agree to apply SPS measures only to the extent necessary to 
protect human, animal, or plant life and health—provided they are based on scientific evidence and information. At 
the same time, the SPS Agreement explicitly recognizes each country’s right to determine its appropriate level of 
protection. However, member countries are encouraged to observe established and recognized international 
standards, and SPS measures may not be applied in a manner that arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminates between 
WTO members where identical standards prevail.  
For more background information on SPS measures and the SPS Agreement, see CRS Report R43450, Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) and Related Non-Tariff Barriers to Agricultural Trade. 
USTR regularly reports on a range of ongoing trade concerns in its annual National Trade 
Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE) report, which covers trade barriers affecting 
U.S. agricultural and non-food exports for the major U.S. trading partners. The most recent NTE 
report highlights certain outstanding issues involving SPS and U.S. trade with its NAFTA 
partners. Select trade disputes between the United States and its NAFTA partners are discussed 
later in “Addressing Outstanding Trade Disputes.” 
Formal Dispute Resolution Mechanism 
NAFTA created both formal and informal mechanisms to resolve trade disputes among partner 
countries.17 NAFTA’s formal mechanism for resolving disputes covers the agreement’s provisions 
for investment (Chapter 11) and services (Chapter 14), the antidumping (AD) and countervailing 
duty (CVD) determinations (Chapter 19), and the general interpretation and application of the 
agreement (Chapter 20). NAFTA’s rules-based systems for resolving disputes is meant to 
strengthen trade relations by providing an orderly, legal framework that defines and protects the 
interests of all partner countries. Table 2 highlights selected examples of dispute resolution 
through NAFTA, encompassing AD and CVD actions, NAFTA arbitration panels, government 
and industry negotiations, and technical assistance involving SPS measures. 
                                                 
16 Zahniser and Link. 
17 For a historical reference, see J. F. Smith and M. Whitney, “The Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of the NAFTA and 
Agriculture,” Agricultural Law Research Article (originally published in North Dakota Law Review, vol. 68, no. 567 
[1992]). For other general information, see CRS In Focus IF10645, Dispute Settlement in U.S. Trade Agreements. 
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Agricultural AD and CVD investigations and duty assessments under Chapter 19 provide a way 
for NAFTA countries to address trade disputes resulting from perceived unfair trade practices. It 
allows exporters and domestic producers a way to make their case and appeal the results of trade-
remedy investigations before an independent and objective binational panel, and it provides an 
alternative option to judicial review of such decisions before domestic courts. AD duties may be 
imposed if imports are being sold at less than fair value and causing or threatening to cause injury 
to a domestic industry. CVD duties may be imposed on imported goods to offset subsidies 
provided to producers or exporters by the government of the exporting country, and they must 
also meet an injury test. Under NAFTA, each country may apply its own AD and CVD laws but 
must publish a notice of national investigations and inform others on how to provide input.18  
Table 2. Selected Examples of Resolving Trade Disputes Through NAFTA 
National 
countervailing duty 
(CVD) or 
antidumping (AD) 
actions 
 Mexico investigated or implemented duties on high fructose corn syrup (HFCS), hogs, apples, and 
wheat from the United States and wheat from Canada. 
 The United States investigated, or implemented duties on, tomatoes and broomcorn brooms from 
Mexico and potatoes, beef, and wheat from Canada. 
 Canada investigated and placed duties on U.S. apples, refined sugar, and potatoes. 
NAFTA arbitration 
panels 
 Chapter 19 panels considered Mexican AD duties on U.S. HFCS exports, U.S. refined sugar and 
product exports to Canada, Canadian swine exports to the United States, and Mexican fresh cut 
flower exports to the United States.  
 Chapter 20 panels considered Canadian TRQs on poultry, dairy, barley, and margarine and U.S. 
safeguards on broomcorn brooms from Mexico. 
Government 
negotiations 
(including internal 
working groups 
involving multiple 
federal agencies) 
 Increased vigilance to assess and eradicate plant and animal pests and diseases—often referred to 
as regionalization of SPS standards—has addressed hog cholera, poultry Newcastle disease, 
avocado fruit fly, and karnal bunt in Mexico and the United States.  
 The United States and Mexico have addressed certain market issues, including establishing 
minimum price agreements for U.S. apples and Mexican tomatoes, and negotiated outcomes for 
U.S.-Canada trade in beef, pork, and wheat. Certain policy procedures have also been addressed 
including modifications to Mexico’s dry bean quota auction system and U.S-Canada sweetener 
trade. 
Industry 
Negotiations 
U.S. and Mexican grape industries resolved dispute over Mexican labeling regulations. Mexican and U.S. 
cattle industry negotiations prevented Mexican AD. Advisory Committee on Private Commercial 
Disputes Regarding Agricultural Goods is established. 
Technical Assistance NAFTA Sanitary and Phytosanitary Committee facilitates regional technical cooperation. The United 
States and Mexico established bilateral Plant Health Working Group and Karnal Bunt Team. The two 
countries also cooperating in development of Mexican national grading and standards system for 
perishable commodities. 
Source: S. Zahniser and J. Link, Effects of North American Free Trade Agreement on Agriculture and the Rural 
Economy, USDA Economic Research Service, WRS-02-1, July 2002. 
Notes: For a listing of decisions and reports, see NAFTA Secretariat, https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/
Dispute-Settlement/Decisions-and-Reports. 
Additional general dispute settlement is provided under NAFTA’s Chapter 20. The NAFTA 
secretariat is responsible for the administration of the dispute settlement process under both 
Chapters 19 and 20. Previous disputes and decisions involving the NAFTA secretariat cover 
refined sugar, sugar beets, and HFCS;19 softwood lumber;20 wheat;21 apples; and beef, pork, and 
                                                 
18 M. Burfisher, T. Norman, and R. Schwartz, “NAFTA Trade Dispute Resolution: What Are the Mechanisms?,” in 
Lyons et al., Trade Liberalization Under NAFTA, pp. 132-142. 
19 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10517, U.S. Stakeholders Critical of U.S.-Mexico Sugar Agreements; and 
CRS In Focus IF10034, New Era Dawns in U.S.-Mexico Sugar Trade. 
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poultry products; among other products.22 Other types of disputes involving U.S. agricultural 
markets and Canada or Mexico have included trade concerns involving milk products,23 country-
of-origin labeling (COOL) of meat products,24 and potatoes. Some of these trade disputes have 
been formerly addressed within the framework of the WTO outside NAFTA. 
Agricultural Trade Trends with NAFTA Partners 
Canada and Mexico are key U.S. agricultural trading partners. Since NAFTA was implemented, 
the value of U.S. agricultural trade with Canada and Mexico has increased sharply and now 
accounts for a large overall share of all U.S. agricultural exports and imports.  
Agricultural products presented here cover commodities as defined by USDA for the purposes of 
calculating U.S. agricultural exports, imports, and the agricultural trade balance. This definition 
includes raw and bulk agricultural commodities, nursery products, wine, and cotton fiber 
products. This definition excludes fish and seafood, distilled spirits and other beverages, and 
manufactured tobacco products (see text box).  
USDA’s Definition of Agricultural Products in U.S. Trade 
USDA’s definition of “agricultural products" (often referred to as "food and fiber" products)—for the purposes of 
calculating U.S. agricultural exports, imports, and the agricultural trade balance—covers a broad range of goods from 
unprocessed bulk commodities such as soybeans, feed corn, wheat, rice, and raw cotton to highly processed, high-
value foods and beverages such as sausages, bakery goods, ice cream, beer and wine, and condiments sold in retail 
stores and restaurants. 
All of the products found in Chapters 1-24 of the U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) are considered agricultural 
products. Exceptions include fishery products (Chapters 3 and 16), manufactured tobacco products such as cigarettes 
and cigars (Chapter 24), and distilled spirits (Chapter 22).  
Agricultural products within these chapters generally fall into the following categories: grains, animal feeds, and grain 
products (such as bread and pasta); oilseeds and oilseed products (such as soybean oil and olive oil); livestock, 
poultry, and dairy products including live animals, meats, eggs, and feathers; horticultural products including all fresh 
and processed fruits, vegetables, tree nuts, as well as nursery products, and beer and wine; unmanufactured tobacco; 
and tropical products such as sugar, cocoa, and coffee. (“Animals and Products” generally include live animals, red 
meat, poultry, and dairy products, fats and oils, hides and skins, wool and mohair, and other miscellaneous products.) 
Products outside of Chapters 1-24 are also considered agricultural products. These include essential oils (Chapter 
33), raw rubber (Chapter 40), raw animal hides and skins (Chapter 41), and wool and cotton (Chapters 51-52). 
Some products derived from plants or animals that are not considered "agricultural" because of their manufactured 
nature are cotton thread and yarn; fabric, textiles, and clothing; leather and leather articles of apparel; cigarettes and 
cigars; and distilled spirits. USDA's trade databases also include selected "non-agricultural" commodities. These 
include manufactured products derived from plants or animals (such as yarns, fabrics, textiles, leather, articles of apparel, 
cigarettes and cigars, and spirits) or products used in the farm production process (such as agricultural chemicals, 
fertilizers, and farm machinery). Other “non-agricultural” commodities in USDA’s trade databases are fishery and 
seafood products given their food value (as USDA collaborates with the seafood industry to promote exports) and solid 
wood products (as USDA also collaborates with U.S. industry to promote exports of these products). 
Source: USDA, “GATS Agricultural Products Definition,” https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/AgriculturalProducts.aspx. 
                                                                
(...continued) 
20 For more information, see CRS Report R42789, Softwood Lumber Imports from Canada: Current Issues.  
21 For more information, see CRS Report RL32426, U.S.-Canada Wheat Trade Dispute. 
22 NAFTA secretariat’s decisions and reports can be found at https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Dispute-
Settlement/Decisions-and-Reports. 
23 See CRS Insight IN10692, New Canadian Dairy Pricing Regime Proves Disruptive for U.S. Milk Producers.  
24 See CRS Report RS22955, Country-of-Origin Labeling for Foods and the WTO Trade Dispute on Meat Labeling. 
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Total Agricultural Trade 
Over the past 25 years since NAFTA was implemented, the value of U.S. agricultural trade with 
Canada and Mexico has increased dramatically. Exports rose from $8.7 billion in 1992 to $38.1 
billion in 2016, while imports rose from $6.5 billion to $44.5 billion over the same period (Table 
3). This resulted in a $6.4 billion trade deficit for agricultural products in 2016, despite trends in 
previous years when there was a trade surplus (Figure 1). For example, from 2007-2011, U.S. 
agricultural trade to its NAFTA partners consistently showed a trade surplus, averaging $2.4 
billion per year. This compares to the past five years (2012-2016), when the U.S. trade deficit 
averaged $1.8 billion per year. In general, trade balances tend to be variable year-to-year 
depending on market and production conditions, commodity prices and currency exchange rates, 
and consumer demand, among many other factors.  
Adjusted for inflation, growth in the value of total U.S. agricultural exports and imports with its 
NAFTA partners have increased roughly threefold, growing at an average rate of about 5-6% 
annually25 (Figure 2, Figure 3).  
Figure 1. U.S.-NAFTA Agricultural Trade, 1990-2016 
 
Source: CRS from USDA, https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/ExpressQuery1.aspx. Data are not adjusted for inflation. 
Notes: Agricultural products presented here cover commodities as defined by USDA. 
NAFTA countries are key U.S. agricultural trading partners. As a share of U.S. trade, Canada and 
Mexico are ranked second and third (after China) as leading export markets for U.S. agricultural 
products. In 2016, Canada and Mexico accounted for 28% the total value of U.S. agricultural 
exports and 39% of its imports. This compares to 1992 (pre-NAFTA), when Canada and Mexico 
accounted for 20% and 26% of U.S. agricultural export and import values, respectively. In 2016, 
leading traded agricultural products under NAFTA were meat and dairy products; grains and feed; 
fruits, tree nuts, and vegetables; oilseeds; and sugar and related products. 
  
                                                 
25 Based on compound annual rate of growth, or the year-over-year growth rate, calculated on trends adjusted for 
inflation using a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator (2010=100). 
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Table 3. U.S. Agricultural Export and Import Trade, Total and NAFTA Partners 
Year 
Total Ag 
Exports 
Total Ag 
Imports 
Ag Exports 
to Canada 
Ag Imports 
from Canada 
Ag Exports 
to Mexico 
Ag Imports 
from Mexico 
NAFTA Ag 
Exports 
NAFTA Ag 
Imports 
Net 
Trade 
($billions) 
1990 39.5 22.9 4.2 3.2 2.6 2.6 6.8 5.8 1.0 
1991 39.4 22.9 4.6 3.3 3.0 2.5 7.6 5.9 1.8 
1992 43.2 24.8 4.9 4.1 3.8 2.4 8.7 6.5 2.2 
1993 43.0 25.1 5.3 4.7 3.6 2.7 8.9 7.4 1.6 
1994 46.2 27.0 5.6 5.3 4.6 2.9 10.1 8.2 1.9 
1995 56.2 30.3 5.8 5.6 3.5 3.8 9.3 9.5 -0.1 
1996 60.4 33.5 6.1 6.8 5.4 3.8 11.6 10.6 1.0 
1997 57.1 36.1 6.8 7.4 5.2 4.1 12.0 11.6 0.4 
1998 51.8 36.9 7.0 7.8 6.2 4.7 13.1 12.5 0.7 
1999 48.4 37.7 7.1 8.0 5.6 4.9 12.7 12.9 -0.2 
2000 51.3 39.0 7.6 8.7 6.4 5.1 14.1 13.7 0.3 
2001 53.7 39.4 8.1 9.9 7.4 5.3 15.5 15.1 0.4 
2002 53.1 41.9 8.7 10.3 7.2 5.5 15.9 15.9 0.0 
2003 59.4 47.4 9.3 10.3 7.9 6.3 17.2 16.6 0.6 
2004 61.4 54.0 9.7 11.5 8.5 7.3 18.2 18.7 -0.5 
2005 63.2 59.3 10.6 12.3 9.4 8.3 20.0 20.6 -0.6 
2006 71.0 65.3 12.0 13.4 10.9 9.4 22.8 22.8 0.0 
2007 90.0 71.9 14.1 15.2 12.7 10.2 26.8 25.4 1.3 
2008 114.8 80.5 16.3 18.0 15.5 10.9 31.8 28.9 2.8 
2009 98.5 71.7 15.7 14.7 12.9 11.4 28.7 26.1 2.6 
2010 115.8 81.9 16.9 16.2 14.6 13.6 31.5 29.8 1.7 
2011 136.4 99.0 19.0 18.9 18.4 15.8 37.4 34.8 2.6 
2012 141.6 102.9 20.6 20.2 18.9 16.4 39.5 36.6 2.9 
2013 144.4 104.2 21.4 21.8 18.1 17.7 39.5 39.4 0.0 
2014 150.0 111.8 22.0 23.2 19.4 19.3 41.3 42.5 -1.1 
2015 133.1 113.6 21.0 21.8 17.7 21.0 38.7 42.9 -4.2 
2016 134.9 114.6 20.2 21.6 17.8 23.0 38.1 44.5 -6.4 
Source: CRS from USDA, https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/ExpressQuery1.aspx. Data are not adjusted for inflation. 
Notes: Agricultural products presented here cover commodities as defined by USDA. 
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Figure 2. U.S. Agricultural Exports 
 
Source: CRS from USDA data. Area data are 
nominal; line data (reflecting total exports) are 
adjusted for inflation (GDP deflator (2010=100)). 
Figure 3. U.S. Agricultural Imports 
 
Source: CRS from USDA data. Area data are 
nominal; line data (reflecting total imports) are 
adjusted for inflation (GDP deflator (2010=100)). 
Reports by USDA further highlight how U.S. agricultural exports to its NAFTA partners have 
increased as a share of the total value of U.S. trade, often triggering shifts in trade with other U.S. 
trading partners. As part of its 20-year retrospective analysis of the impacts of NAFTA on the 
U.S. agricultural sectors,26 USDA reports that U.S. agricultural exports to NAFTA countries 
comprised 20% of the total value of total agricultural exports in 1991-1993, rising to 28% in 
2010-2012. Exports to China and Hong Kong rose even more sharply, from 3% to 18% over the 
same period. In contrast, U.S. agricultural exports to other U.S. FTA partners rose slightly, and 
exports to the rest of the world dropped from about 77% to 54% of the value of U.S. exports. 
USDA’s analysis also indicates that U.S. agricultural imports are now also more widely supplied 
by its NAFTA partners: Canada and Mexico comprised 27% of the total value of U.S. agricultural 
imports in 1991-1993, rising to 36% in 2010-2012. According to USDA, the value of agricultural 
imports from China and Hong Kong rose slightly, from 2% to 4% of total value, while 
agricultural imports from other U.S. FTA partners and the rest of the world dropped from about 
70% to 60%. 
Agricultural Trade with Canada 
In 2016, U.S. agricultural exports to Canada were valued at $20.2 billion (Figure 4). Fish and 
seafood exports—while not included in the total for agricultural products—amounted to another 
$1.1 billion. Leading U.S. agricultural exports to Canada were (ranked in descending order based 
on value) grains and feed; animal products; fruits, vegetables, and related products; sugar/tropical 
products; other horticultural products; oilseeds; nuts; beverages (excluding fruit juice); and 
essential oils.27  
In 2016, U.S. agricultural imports from Canada were valued at $21.6 billion (Figure 5). Fish and 
seafood imports totaled another $3.2 billion. Leading U.S. agricultural imports from Canada were 
                                                 
26 Zahniser et al., NAFTA at 20, p. 5. 
27 Refers to oils extracted from plants and plant material typically through distillation used as an ingredient in foods 
(e.g., as a flavoring) or in cosmetics and body products (e.g., as a fragrance) and other uses (e.g., aromatherapy). 
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grains and feed; animal products; oilseeds; cocoa/sugar and related products; fruits, vegetables, 
and related products; other horticultural products; coffee; and beverages.  
Since NAFTA was implemented, the balance of agricultural trade between the United States and 
Canada has alternated between a trade surplus and a trade deficit (Figure 6). Over the past five 
years (2012-2016), the U.S. trade deficit with Canada has averaged about $0.7 billion per year. 
Figure 4. U.S. Agricultural Exports to Canada, 1990-2016 
 
Source: CRS from USDA, https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/ExpressQuery1.aspx. Data are not adjusted for inflation. 
Notes: Agricultural products presented here cover commodities as defined by USDA. 
Figure 5. U.S. Agricultural Imports from Canada, 1990-2016 
 
Source: CRS from USDA, https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/ExpressQuery1.aspx. Data are not adjusted for inflation. 
Notes: Agricultural products presented here cover commodities as defined by USDA. 
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Figure 6. U.S.-Canada Agricultural Trade 
 
Source: CRS from USDA data. 
Figure 7. U.S.-Mexico Agricultural Trade 
 
Source: CRS from USDA data. 
Agricultural Trade with Mexico 
In 2016, U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico were valued at $17.8 billion (Figure 8). Fish and 
seafood exports were negligible (less than $100 million). Leading U.S. agricultural exports to 
Mexico were (ranked in descending order based on value): animal products; grains and feed; 
oilseeds; sugar/tropical products; other horticultural products; fruits, nuts, and vegetables, and 
related products; cotton; seeds and nursery products.  
In 2016, U.S. agricultural imports from Mexico were valued at $23.0 billion (Figure 9). Fish and 
seafood imports totaled another $0.6 billion. Leading U.S. agricultural imports from Mexico were 
fruits, vegetables, and related products; beverages; animal products; sugar/products; grains and 
feeds; nuts; cocoa/products; fruit juices; and coffee. 
The balance of agricultural trade between the United States and Mexico has alternated between a 
trade surplus and a trade deficit since NAFTA was implemented (Figure 7). Over the past five 
years (2012-2016), taking into account alternating periods of trade surplus and deficit, the U.S. 
agricultural trade deficit with Mexico averaged $1.1 billion per year. The deficit has grown more 
sharply in recent years as overall U.S. agricultural imports from Mexico have continued to grow 
while U.S. exports to Mexico have receded. Prior to 2015, U.S.-Mexico agricultural trade 
consistently showed a U.S. trade surplus. From 2007-2011, U.S.-Mexico agricultural trade 
consistently showed a trade surplus, averaging $2.4 billion per year. 
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Figure 8. U.S. Agricultural Exports to Mexico, 1990-2016 
 
Source: CRS from USDA, https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/ExpressQuery1.aspx. Data are not adjusted for inflation. 
Notes: Agricultural products presented here cover commodities as defined by USDA. 
Figure 9. U.S. Agricultural Imports from Mexico, 1990-2016 
 
Source: CRS from USDA, https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/ExpressQuery1.aspx. Data are not adjusted for inflation. 
Notes: Agricultural products presented here cover commodities as defined by USDA.  
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Selected State-Level Trade 
Leading agricultural exporting states are California, Iowa, Illinois, Nebraska, Minnesota, Texas, 
Indiana, Kansas, North Dakota, and Washington (Figure 10). USDA-reported export data by state 
are not available by country of destination and date back to 2000 only.28 Therefore, available state 
data from USDA are not entirely suitable for showing trends under NAFTA at the state-level. 
Limited additional trade data are reported by some states. For example, the state of California 
compiles and reports official annual agricultural export data.29 These data are derived from port of 
export district data reported in the official U.S. trade data, published industry sources, and 
unpublished government and industry information. Comparable official state data are not 
available to examine U.S. or state-level agricultural imports.30 For California, available state-
reported export data indicate that the state’s agricultural exports have grown substantially over the 
past decade, totaling more than $20.7 billion in 2015—a more than threefold increase compared 
to the 1990s. Of total agricultural exports, NAFTA countries comprised the largest market for 
California’s farm exports, accounting for 22% of California’s agricultural exports. Leading 
exports to Canada were wine, lettuce, strawberries, table grapes, processed tomatoes, almonds, 
oranges, raspberries and blackberries, carrots, walnuts, peaches and nectarines, cauliflower, 
broccoli, spinach, pistachios, and dairy products. Leading exports to Mexico were dairy products, 
table grapes, processed tomatoes, almonds, peaches and nectarines, flowers and nursery plants, 
walnuts, pistachios, strawberries, rice, cotton, raisins, plums, oranges, lettuce, and kiwi fruit. 
Agricultural exports from California to Canada and Mexico comprise roughly 10% of total U.S. 
agricultural exports to NAFTA partners. 
Similar trade data are not readily available for other states. However, industry reports indicate 
that both Mexico and Canada are leading markets for Iowa’s pork products31 and also grain 
products from some Northern Plains states.32 
State-level data are not available to assess the estimated economic effects of NAFTA on key 
agricultural producing and exporting states. Studies exist for a few states, such as California,33 but 
much of this research is dated and is not comprehensive. 
                                                 
28 A separate USDA data series of state-level exports is available from 1990-2010, reflecting mostly fiscal year data. 
The Department of Commerce tracks state-level trade data, but these data are more focused on total commodity trade 
(including non-agricultural products) and date back to 2008 only (https://servicescoalition.org/services-issues/exports). 
29 Agricultural Issues Center, University of California-Davis, http://aic.ucdavis.edu/pub/exports.html. These official 
state data are available from 1995 to 2015. Data for leading California export markets are available from 1999 to 2015.  
30 Limited state-level data are available from the Department of Commerce, starting in 2008, but these data have not 
been vetted by USDA or state officials similar to that for the state export data and may not be comparable. 
31 J. Weber, “Withdrawing from NAFTA Could Devastate U.S. Farmer,” Des Moines Register, June 6, 2017. 
32 U.S. Grains Council, “Statement on Potential NAFTA Withdrawal,” press release, April 26, 2017. 
33 For example, see H. Brunke and D. A. Sumner, “Role of NAFTA in California Agriculture: A Brief Review,” 
University of California Agricultural Issues Center, AIC Issues Brief Number 21, February 2003. 
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Figure 10. Agricultural Exports, Leading U.S. States (2015) 
 
Source: USDA, “State Export Data,” https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/state-export-data/. 
Notes: State-level trade data are limited, and trends under NAFTA or agricultural trade among the NAFTA 
countries by state are not available. 
Estimating NAFTA Effects 
Estimating the economic impact of NAFTA to the U.S. agriculture industry is not straightforward. 
It is difficult to isolate changes in U.S. agricultural trade and markets attributable to NAFTA’s 
implementation from other factors that may have influenced trade over this period. Such non-
NAFTA influences include changes in agricultural policies, advances in technology (including the 
Internet), and growing integration of the global economy.34 U.S. tariffs and trade protections for 
food and agricultural products were already minimal before NAFTA was implemented.35 Trade 
liberalization and expansion and increased foreign direct investment in the food and agricultural 
sectors had begun before NAFTA was implemented.36 In addition, available data are often 
incomplete and of limited use in generating accurate results from economic models. Such 
estimates may also provide an incomplete accounting of the total economic effects of trade 
agreements.37  
Among the types of generally acknowledged benefits from trade are greater market access and a 
reduction in barriers to economic activities (e.g., tariff and other non-tariff trade barriers); lower 
consumer prices, more product variety, and year-round access for certain products. Higher 
                                                 
34 J. E. Taylor and D. Charlton, “Adjusting to a Post-NAFTA Mexico: What It Means for California,” University of 
California-Davis, presented to California Chamber of Commerce, May 6, 2014. See also CRS Report R42965, The 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
35 R. L. Cook, “NAFTA: Neither Villain Nor Saviour,” ARE Update, vol. 1, no. 1 (Fall 1997). 
36 Ibid. Also A. de Janvry et al., “NAFTA and Agriculture: An Early Assessment,” University of California-Berkeley, 
Working Paper #807, April 1997; and P. Rosson et al., “North American Free Trade and U.S. Agriculture,” Texas 
A&M University, RM6-8.0, May 1998. 
37 For example, many models are unable to measure the impact of reducing non-tariff barriers. For more information, 
see CRS In Focus IF10161, International Trade Agreements and Job Estimates; and CRS Report R44546, The 
Economic Effects of Trade: Overview and Policy Challenges. 
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product sales through exports contribute to economic growth, as do higher incomes in trading 
partner countries, which contribute to increased demand for higher-value agricultural products.38 
Others point to the benefits of regional trade agreements, including market integration, 
competitive or complementary economic linkages, and geographical proximity.39 
In general, NAFTA is considered to have benefitted U.S. agriculture. Some credit NAFTA with 
further facilitating trade by formalizing these changes and providing a more stable trade 
environment among the NAFTA partner countries. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce states: 
“NAFTA has been a bonanza for U.S. farmers and ranchers, helping U.S. agricultural exports to 
Canada and Mexico to increase by 350%,” despite growth over the period in Mexico’s 
agricultural production.40 USTR also claims that NAFTA has benefitted American farmers.41  
Many U.S. food and agricultural industry groups claim that NAFTA has positively affected their 
markets.42 According to an industry coalition group, “NAFTA has been a windfall for U.S. 
farmers, ranchers and food processors.”43 Since the agreement was implemented, trilateral 
agricultural trade among the member countries has risen sharply. Additionally, trade with Canada 
and Mexico comprise an ever-larger share of U.S. agricultural markets. Many attribute generally 
lower U.S. consumer prices and improved consumer choices and variety (e.g., imports of off-
season produce and greater variety of food products) to NAFTA’s elimination of tariffs and quota 
restrictions under the agreement. Others note that as Mexico’s consumer incomes improve, U.S. 
agricultural exporters could benefit from increased market demand for some food products.44 
Some claim that NAFTA has resulted in both benefits and losses, and that positive and negative 
impacts attributed to the agreement have been overstated or mixed.45 Economic impacts under 
NAFTA depend on what is produced and where it is produced. This is also true regarding the 
agreement’s effects on employment and wages, as some workers and industries have faced 
disruptions due to loss of market share from increased competition, while others have gained 
from the new market opportunities that were created.46 Yet others claim that NAFTA has further 
contributed to consolidation in North America’s agriculture, resulting in fewer small farms, 
particularly in Mexico.47  
In the end, the extent to which NAFTA has benefitted the U.S. economy is not clear cut, since the 
gains could be partly attributable to Mexico’s unilateral liberalization (which was happening at 
the same time as NAFTA) or to gains attributable to the U.S.-Canada FTA (CUSTA, which was 
                                                 
38 See, for example, Brunke and Sumner, “Role of NAFTA in California Agriculture.” 
39 See, for example, M. E. Burfisher, et al., “The Impact of NAFTA on the United States,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol. 15, no. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 125-144. 
40 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, NAFTA Triumphant: Assessing Two Decades of Gains in Trade, Growth. and Jobs, 
October 2015. 
41 USTR “NAFTA Good for Farmers, Good for America,” press release, June 2001. 
42 See, for example, comments from U.S. agricultural industry representatives at a Farm Foundation Forum, “The 
Future of the North American Free Trade Agreement,” April 26, 2017; and numerous letters from industry groups to 
Congress and the Trump Administration highlighted later in this report. 
43 Letter to President Trump from the U.S. Food and Agriculture Dialogue for Trade, January 23, 2017. 
44 R. Cook, “NAFTA at 11: Impact on the California Fresh Produce Industry,” University of California, April 2005. 
45 See, for example, G. C. Hufbauer, et al., “NAFTA at 20: Misleading Charges and Positive Achievements,” Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, May 2014; and Cook, “NAFTA: Neither Villain Nor Saviour.” 
46 Comments by Ken Barbic, Western Growers, at a Global Business Dialogue (GBD) Colloquium, May 25, 2017; and 
J. McBride and M. Sergie, “NAFTA’s Economic Impact,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 24, 2017. 
47 Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, “NAFTA and U.S. Farmers—20 Years Later,” November, 2013. For more 
background information regarding Mexico, see CRS Report RL34733, NAFTA and the Mexican Economy. 
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already in effect before NAFTA was negotiated). Other factors have influenced regional 
agricultural trade, including changes in Mexico’s agricultural policies and workforce, advances in 
technology (e.g., e-commerce, greenhouse production), disruption due to the peso devaluation in 
the 1990s and the economic downturns in 2001 and 2009, and competing buyers and sellers of 
agricultural commodities in countries outside of NAFTA. Other market developments that may 
have influenced North American trade since NAFTA’s implementation include alternative product 
uses (e.g., corn used in ethanol production and corn byproducts, such as dried distiller grains) and 
other market substitution effects, changes in crop mix, mechanization, increases in labor 
efficiencies, and growing integration of the global economy.48 
Improved Market Integration 
As part of its 20-year retrospective analysis of the impacts of NAFTA on the U.S. agricultural 
sectors, USDA concluded that “NAFTA has had a profound effect on many aspects of North 
American agriculture over the past two decades,” contributing to increased market integration and 
cross-border investment and other “important changes in consumption and production.”49 USDA’s 
assessment is based on cross-border economic activity (primarily agricultural trade and 
intraregional foreign direct investment [FDI]50) as well as tariffs, quotas, and other barriers to 
trade and investment.  
According to USDA:  
NAFTA has had a substantial impact on the integration of North America’s agricultural 
markets.... Integration is visible in increased cross-border flows of goods, services, 
capital, and labor. Trade in goods consists of not only final consumer products but also 
intermediate inputs and raw materials, as firms reorganize their activities around regional 
markets for both inputs and outputs, spurred in part by greater foreign direct investment 
(FDI). In addition, decision-makers in both the government and the private sector 
continue to pursue a course of greater institutional and policy cooperation and 
coordination to encourage further market integration. 
Most agricultural sectors within NAFTA are associated with a high degree of market integration.51 
A few sectors are associated with medium integration, including U.S. and Canada wheat markets 
and also markets adversely affected by the retaliatory tariffs applied by Mexico in conjunction 
with the U.S.-Mexico trucking dispute.52 Market integration is low in sectors that were exempted 
from NAFTA, such as between the U.S. and Canadian dairy, poultry, and egg product sectors. 
USDA’s analysis provides additional examples of how NAFTA has advanced the integration of 
North America regional agriculture, broken down by selected commodity groupings—grains and 
oilseeds; livestock and animal products; fruits and vegetables; sugar and sweeteners; cotton, 
textiles, and apparel; and processed foods. And despite improved market integration, USDA’s 
analysis indicates that prices are still not fully integrated in North American agriculture.53  
                                                 
48 See, for example, J.E. Taylor and D. Charlton, “Adjusting to a Post-NAFTA Mexico: What It Means for California,” 
University of California, May 6, 2014. 
49 Zahniser et al., NAFTA at 20, p. 1.  
50 As defined by the U.S. Department of Commerce, FDI refers to the “ownership or control, directly or indirectly, by 
one foreign resident, the foreign parent, of at least 10 percent of a [domestic] business enterprise.” 
51 As described by USDA: “Market integration is the extent to which one or more formerly separated markets have 
combined to form a single market.” 
52 For more information, see CRS Report RL32724, Mexico and the 112th Congress. 
53 Ibid. 
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USDA’s analysis concludes that NAFTA has resulted in substantial levels of foreign investment in 
the processed food sectors but that NAFTA has only a small, positive net effect on U.S. 
agricultural employment. Regionalization of SPS standards—referring to increased vigilance to 
assess and eradicate plant and animal pests and diseases—is also attributed with facilitating trade 
in North American meat and produce markets.54 
Participants at a 2001 workshop agreed that “Mexico and Canada had clearly benefited from 
NAFTA, that processors of higher valued products in all three countries were the greatest 
beneficiaries, and that small Mexican producers were the biggest losers.”55 The greatest 
beneficiaries were said to be producers of feed grain and oilseeds and processors of high-value 
products, such as processed foods, produce, and horticultural products. 
Increased Foreign Direct Investment 
According to USDA, Mexico is the third-largest host country for U.S. direct investment in the 
global food and beverage industries and has also attracted FDI in production agriculture—much 
of it since NAFTA was implemented.56 Some, however, claim that Mexican restrictions on 
corporate farming, acreage limits, and land investment restrictions in coastal and border areas 
have been a constraint to U.S. investment in some sectors.57 
The most recent available Commerce Department data indicate that U.S. direct investment in 
Mexico on a historical-cost basis (i.e., the stock of direct investment) was about $3.6 billion in the 
food industry in 2011, $4.2 billion in the beverage industry in 2010, and $375 million in crop and 
animal production combined in 2007. Since NAFTA, the U.S. direct investment position in the 
Mexican food and beverage industries has expanded greatly, “rising from a total for the two 
industries of about $2.3 billion in 1993 to about $8.7 billion in 2007, before declining to about 
$7.5 billion in 2010.”58 Most U.S. investment has been in the beverage industry.  
Canada is also a major recipient of U.S. direct investment. In 2010, according to USDA, U.S. 
direct investment in Canada’s food and beverage industries was $5.9 billion and $7.8 billion, 
respectively.59 USDA’s retrospective analysis further highlights that NAFTA has resulted in 
substantial levels of foreign investment in the processed food sectors.60  
U.S.-Mexico Competitive Conditions 
Researchers at the University of California (UC) highlight some of the common myths about the 
competitive farm conditions between the United States and Mexico based on an example 
involving fruit and vegetable production.61 Contrary to popular belief, Mexico does not 
necessarily have an advantage in agricultural production because of relatively lower wage rates 
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and worker benefits for labor-intensive agricultural products (such as fruits and vegetables), labor 
abundance, or lower environmental and food safety standards. In reality, fruit and vegetable 
production places demands on capital, technology, management, research, marketing, and 
infrastructure. Mexico’s principal advantage is seasonal (climatic advantage) rather than a cost 
advantage. Mexican farm labor is generally less well-trained and less efficient, offsetting some of 
its wage rate advantage. Some Mexican growing areas also experience labor shortages. In 
addition, Mexican growers often provide social services for workers, such as housing and 
schools, which raises production costs. Most Mexican producers who grow for export markets 
must also meet necessary product quality and safety standards and be third-party certified. 
Mexico also has a disadvantage in marketing and in the buyers’ perception of its products, as well 
as in research and development (R&D) and infrastructure, compared to United States. 
These same UC researchers further highlight some the competitive advantages of agricultural 
production in United States compared to Mexico.62 For example, the U.S. agricultural sectors 
continue to benefit from R&D from federal institutions—such as USDA and the land grant 
university system—and public sector investments in transportation and infrastructure of many 
types, including water storage and distribution. U.S. producers also benefit from extensive private 
sector research targeting specific crop needs, transparent and relatively responsive government 
support, and direct access to the U.S. domestic markets—still the world’s largest consumer 
market.  
One of the more controversial aspects of NAFTA has been its effect on the agricultural sector in 
Mexico and the perception that the agreement has caused a higher amount of worker 
displacement in the agricultural sector than in other sectors of the economy. Some claim that 
Mexico has been impacted by transitory poverty created by economic adjustments and also social 
exclusion to the benefits of globalization.63 Although Mexico’s farm exports rose sharply, rural 
poverty levels in Mexico remain the same as before the agreement, and the expected wage and 
income convergence between Mexico and the United States did not happen.64 Some have called 
for reform of NAFTA to address these and other perceived concerns in Mexico’s farming 
community.65 Others dispute the role of trade in Mexico’s rural poverty.66 While NAFTA likely 
contributed to changes to Mexico’s agricultural sector, given increasing import competition from 
the United States, some changes are likely also attributable to Mexico’s policy reforms to its 
agricultural sectors.67 
Industry Reaction to Potential NAFTA Changes 
Many stakeholders in U.S. agricultural sectors have expressed opposition to the Trump 
Administration’s decision to withdraw from TPP and threats to withdraw from NAFTA, citing 
benefits to the food and agricultural industries from trade and potential for disruptions in U.S. 
export markets given growing uncertainty in U.S. trade policy. However, some in Congress and 
within the U.S. agriculture are cautiously supporting efforts to renegotiate or “modernize” some 
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of NAFTA’s provisions as they pertain to agriculture. Some recommend that many of the 
agricultural provisions agreed to in the TPP agreement could provide a possible model framework 
for a NAFTA renegotiation. 
Reaction to Threats of NAFTA Withdrawal 
In late April 2017, President Trump announced he was considering an executive order to set in 
motion the U.S. withdrawal from NAFTA.68 The response from the U.S. agriculture community 
was swift, with many U.S. agricultural groups expressing strong opposition to outright NAFTA 
withdrawal. Ultimately, President Trump decided not to withdraw from NAFTA at this time. This 
and other recent actions by the Administration have raised concerns in the U.S. agricultural 
community over the uncertainty of U.S. trade policy and the potential for disruptions in U.S. 
export markets.69  
Media reports following the Administration’s announcement highlight opposition to outright 
withdrawal from many in Congress.70 Some in Congress opposed the nomination of Robert 
Lighthizer for USTR, given concerns about the Administration’s intentions regarding U.S. trade 
policy, including NAFTA.71 Several Members of Congress claim that NAFTA has had positive 
impacts on their states’ agricultural sectors.72 
Reactions from a number of U.S. agricultural leaders were starker. According to the National 
Pork Producers Council, NAFTA withdrawal could be “cataclysmic”73 and “financially 
devastating” to U.S. pork producers.74 The National Corn Growers Association said that 
“withdrawing from NAFTA would be disastrous for American agriculture” and disrupt trade with 
the sector’s top trading partners. The American Soybean Association said withdrawing from 
NAFTA is a “terrible idea” and would hamper ongoing recovery in the sector.75 The U.S. Grains 
Council highlighted that withdrawal would have an “immediate effect on sales to Mexico.”76 The 
National Association of Wheat Growers stated that Mexico is the “largest U.S. wheat buyer,” 
accounting for more than 10% of wheat exports annually.77 Fruit and vegetable growers also did 
not support NAFTA withdrawal, citing the benefit of exports to Mexico.78 
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Many U.S. agricultural trade associations continue to express strong support for NAFTA. 
Following the threat of withdrawal and fear that Mexican buyers could seek alternative markets, 
the U.S. corn, soybean, dairy, pork, beef, and rice industries sent high-ranking representatives to 
Mexico to reassure buyers that the U.S. will remain a stable and reliable export market.79 The 
state of Nebraska also hosted a delegation of Mexican grain and food industry officials to shore 
up against possible threats to the U.S.-Mexico trading relationship.80 Various reports indicate that 
Mexico is looking to find alternative suppliers for some imported products, such as rice (which 
could be supplied by Vietnam and Thailand), corn and soybeans (Argentina and Brazil),81 and 
dairy products (New Zealand and Europe).82 Media reports also indicate that Mexico is not 
worried about finding alternative consumer markets for some of its exported products, such as 
avocados, which are now mostly sold to the United States. 
Reaction to Calls to “Modernize” NAFTA 
On May 23, 2017, USTR formally notified Congress of the Administration’s intent to renegotiate 
NAFTA.83 Despite strong opposition to NAFTA withdrawal by many in Congress and much of 
the agricultural industry, some Members of Congress and farm interest groups are supporting 
NAFTA renegotiation.84 Many in Congress want the Trump Administration to pressure Canada to 
change its dairy pricing policies, which they contend discriminate against the United States, and 
to address this issue as part of a NAFTA renegotiation.85 House Ways and Means Committee 
Chairman Kevin Brady stated that “NAFTA contains many good provisions, but portions of it 
should be updated and improved.”86 Others see renegotiation as an opportunity to address 
concerns regarding certain outstanding trade disputes. The state of Washington reportedly sees 
NAFTA renegotiation as an opportunity to address ongoing concerns regarding potatoes, milk, 
cheese, and wine.87 Others support NAFTA renegotiation if it “does no harm” to existing U.S. 
export markets.88 In response to congressional concerns that NAFTA’s renegotiation could be 
“unsettling” to the U.S. agricultural community, the Administration has assured Congress that it 
will protect U.S. agricultural export advantages gained under NAFTA.89 Major food companies 
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have also warned against drastic NAFTA changes and worry about unforeseen consequences of 
opening up the trade deal.90 
An industry coalition of 130 agricultural groups and food companies support the Administration’s 
efforts to modernize NAFTA “in ways that preserve and expand upon the gains achieved.”91 The 
American Farm Bureau Federation claims that there are “compelling reasons to update and 
reform NAFTA from agriculture’s perspective, including improvements to biotechnology, sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures, and geographic indicators.”92 Others support proposals to “update 
and modernize” NAFTA.93  
In addition to addressing Canada’s dairy support and pricing policies, the dairy industry claims 
that “improvements are needed” to address SPS commitments and geographical indications 
(GIs).94 Potato growers support renegotiation to address outstanding concerns in U.S.-Mexico 
potato trade involving SPS measures, which they recommend be addressed similarly to how SPS 
was addressed in the TPP agreement.95 Others call for reforms of Canada’s grain grading 
standards.96 Among groups that rely in part on agricultural product inputs, the U.S. textile, 
apparel, and footwear industry has also expressed strong support for NAFTA and urges that any 
renegotiation “do no harm” to the “successful supply chains” the industry now relies on.97 
U.S. meat and livestock interests are divided over whether NAFTA renegotiation should bring 
country-of-origin labeling (COOL) for meat and pork products back into law: The National 
Cattlemen’s Beef Association does not want to revive mandatory labeling,98 while the National 
Farmers Union sees an opportunity to do so.99  
Many farm interest groups cite commitments agreed to under the TPP agreement as possible 
approaches in renegotiating NAFTA.100 Similarly, others cite provisions regarding agriculture 
discussed during the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) negotiation with the 
European Union (EU) over the past few years.101 Some Canadian officials are recommending that 
provisions in the trade negotiations between the EU and Canada in the EU-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) be used as a blueprint for NAFTA.102 
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The Mexican government is in the process of setting its priorities, which include improving 
competitiveness in the NAFTA region.103 Other Mexican officials have indicated that although 
parts of NAFTA may need to be modernized, the agricultural provisions do not.104 Reportedly, a 
Mexican industry delegation urged the Trump Administration not to take Mexico for granted as a 
market for U.S. agricultural products.105 
However, many in Congress and the U.S. agricultural sectors have expressed the need for caution 
when renegotiating NAFTA.106 In general, most agricultural groups worry about destabilizing 
current markets and the potential unpredictability of future talks.107 They also point out that there 
could be “enormous risks” to existing U.S. export markets if the negotiations were to fail.108 The 
National Association of State Departments of Agriculture supports “prudent” renegotiation that 
does not do away with the “significant gains and advantages” under NAFTA.109 Others wonder 
whether NAFTA renegotiation could backfire, leading to tougher requirements, such as rules of 
origin for goods made in North America110 or additional tariffs or quotas on imports to protect the 
viability of Canadian and Mexican domestic producers.111 The chief agriculture negotiator for 
USTR during the Obama Administration has cautioned the Trump Administration to take a more 
measured approach to any future NAFTA talks and warned that a failure to do so could backfire 
against the U.S. agriculture industry, it being an easy target for retaliation.112 Others note that 
renegotiation may be complicated by the complex nature of agricultural issues.113 
Finally, a coalition of sugar exporting countries (except for Mexico) is urging the Administration 
to take action in its renegotiations to address concerns about Mexico’s sugar shipments to the 
United States.114 Some in Congress, however, argue that the high-profile U.S.-Mexico sugar case 
is not about market access but shipments of subsidized, dumped Mexican sugar.115 On June 6, 
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2017, the United States and Mexico agreed in principle to amendments in the case,116 which could 
remove this contentious issue from any upcoming NAFTA talks. 
Reaction to Decision to Withdraw from TPP 
In January 2017, the Trump Administration formally withdrew the United States from the TPP 
agreement.117 All three NAFTA countries are signatories to TPP. Prior to withdrawal, a broad 
cross-section of agricultural groups and food and agribusiness interests had expressed support for 
implementing TPP, citing increased market access for U.S. farm and food products under the 
agreement and potential for expanded exports. As such, some in the U.S. agricultural sector have 
expressed disappointment at the decision to withdraw from TPP, citing, for example, the 
possibility under the agreement for California agriculture to reach key markets in the Pacific 
Rim.118 In Congress, some Members have expressed the desire to rejoin TPP.119 
However, support for TPP within agriculture, while broad-based, was not universal. A number of 
groups representing agriculture and food industry interests opposed TPP, reflecting concerns 
about competition from imports, the lack of a strong enforcement mechanism against currency 
manipulation, and the potential offshoring of jobs in the food processing sector.  
The TPP agreement sought to liberalize agricultural trade through lower tariffs, expanded TRQs, 
and agreements over rules and procedures for reducing non-tariff barriers. As negotiated, TPP 
would have materially increased the overseas markets to which U.S. farm and food products 
would have preferential access. A 2016 ITC report concluded that TPP would provide significant 
benefits for U.S. agriculture.120  
Regarding renegotiation of some of NAFTA’s agricultural provisions, some stakeholders have 
recommended that many of the agricultural provisions agreed to in the TPP agreement could 
provide a possible framework for any future NAFTA renegotiation. Many U.S. trade groups also 
recommend that negotiators consider many of the types of agricultural commitments agreed to in 
the TPP agreement, which are viewed to have broadly improved upon existing agricultural 
provisions in U.S. FTAs. These changes address SPS and other non-tariff barriers to trade, among 
other issues.121 How some provisions in the TPP agreement could provide a general framework to 
renegotiate certain agricultural provisions is further discussed below in “Options for 
Renegotiating NAFTA.” 
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Options for Renegotiating NAFTA 
The Administration’s official notice to Congress does not cite specific negotiating objectives for 
U.S. agriculture. The Trump Administration’s earlier draft notice sent to congressional leadership 
did outline certain objectives for U.S. agriculture and SPS measures.122 USTR’s request for public 
comment on “matters relevant to the modernization” of NAFTA, however, does address certain 
agricultural issues, including SPS and other technical trade barriers.123  
Among the types of potential gains hoped for by U.S. agricultural exporters from “modernizing” 
NAFTA are improving agricultural market access (e.g., liberalization of remaining dutiable 
agricultural products that were exempted from the agreement and may be subject to TRQs and 
high out-of-quota tariff rates). Other potential areas for modernization include amending, 
updating, or adding to NAFTA’s SPS provisions (e.g., “going beyond” existing WTO rights and 
obligations regarding SPS measures and requiring additional SPS enforcement). Additionally, 
potential gains to U.S. producers could derive from addressing certain outstanding agricultural 
trade disputes between the United States and its NAFTA partners and also addressing concerns 
regarding GIs.124  
A number of these issues were addressed in the TPP agreement125 and have been raised in the T-
TIP negotiations.126 Many industry representatives and some other groups claim that a successful 
NAFTA renegotiation would incorporate many of the types of changes related to food and 
agriculture agreed to in the TPP agreement.127  
Some farm interest groups, however, are pushing for additional changes that go beyond those in 
the TPP. For example, the U.S. Biotech Crops Alliance and the Biotechnology Innovation 
Organization (BIO) recommend that the U.S. enter a “mutual recognition agreement” with 
Canada and Mexico on “the safety determination of biotech crops intended for food, feed and for 
further processing” and “develop a consistent approach to managing low-level presence of 
products that have undergone a complete safety assessment and are approved for use” in other 
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countries to further address how to treat agricultural shipments with trace amounts of 
unauthorized biotech traits.128 
Improving Agricultural Market Access 
Under NAFTA, tariffs and quantitative restrictions were eliminated on most agricultural products, 
with the exception of some that may be subject to TRQs and high out-of-quota tariff rates—such 
as U.S. exports to Canada of dairy products, poultry, and eggs. Some products imported to the 
United States may also be subject to TRQs. According to USTR, imports of U.S. products above 
quota levels may be subject to tariffs as high as 245% for cheese and 298% for butter.129 Canada 
uses supply-management systems to regulate its dairy, chicken, turkey, and egg industries, which 
involves production quotas and producer marketing boards to regulate price and supply, as well as 
TRQs and high over-quota tariffs for imports. NAFTA did not exempt agricultural products from 
U.S.-Mexico trade liberalization. 
Renegotiating NAFTA could address trade liberalization of these additional products. USDA 
officials believe there are opportunities to expand U.S. exports of dairy, poultry, and eggs to 
Canada and Mexico and to even further expand U.S. agricultural exports overall, such as 
expanding corn exports to Mexico to help meet that country’s goals to blend ethanol into its fuel 
supply.130 The Trump Administration has asked ITC to conduct an investigation into the probable 
economic effect of providing duty-free treatment for currently dutiable imports from Canada and 
Mexico, which will likely include these exempted agricultural products. In addition, ITC will 
assess the probable economic effects of eliminating tariffs for more than 380 “import sensitive 
agricultural products,” most of which are currently under TRQs.131  
Potential challenges remain in negotiating additional access of these exempted products, 
especially for milk and dairy products, given Canada’s domestic subsidy and pricing policies. 
Major U.S. dairy market stakeholders—together with their counterparts in several dairy-exporting 
competitor countries—contend that these current policies violate Canada’s commitments under 
NAFTA, the WTO, and also CETA, an FTA between the EU and Canada.132  
Potential for Updating NAFTA’s SPS Provisions 
Several agricultural groups have noted the potential benefits of renegotiation if NAFTA were to 
include updated provisions regarding SPS measures.133 As highlighted by congressional and 
industry leaders, the need to establish “sufficiently enforceable obligations that go beyond the 
                                                 
128 Comments to USTR, June 12, 2017, Docket# USTR-2017-0006. 
129 USTR, 2017 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, p. 66. Canada’s tariff schedule is available 
at Canada Border Services Agency, http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/trade-commerce/tariff-tarif/2017/menu-eng.html. 
130 Comments by Robert Johansson, USDA Chief Economist, at a hearing of the Senate Agriculture Committee, “Farm 
Economy: Perspectives on Rural America,” May 25, 2017. 
131 The investigation was requested by USTR in a letter to the ITC chairman dated May 18, 2017. ITC will consider 
each article in chapters 1 through 97 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States for which tariffs remain. 
Identified “import sensitive agricultural products” cover tariff lines in HTS chapters 02, 04, 06, 07, 08, 10, 11, 12, 15, 
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 2429, 35, 38, 51, and 52. 
132 See, for example, letter to Canadian government trade officials from several U.S. and foreign dairy trade 
associations, September 12, 2016. See also CRS Insight IN10692, New Canadian Dairy Pricing Regime Proves 
Disruptive for U.S. Milk Producers.  
133 Comments by industry representatives at a GBD Colloquium, May 25, 2017. 
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WTO SPS chapter” are among the primary objectives involving agricultural trade.134 Both the 
TPP and T-TIP negotiations addressed concerns involving SPS and TBT issues in agricultural 
trade that “go beyond” commitments in the SPS and the TBT agreements—referred to as “SPS-
Plus” and “TBT-Plus.” SPS-Plus and TBT-Plus concepts are generally intended to amplify and 
enhance the rights and obligations of all WTO members under these two agreements. For further 
background, see discussion in text box. 
SPS-Plus and TBT-Plus Provisions in Recent FTA Negotiations 
SPS-Plus and TBT-Plus provisions were described in a report submitted by U.S. and EU trade officials as part of the 
so-called U.S.-EU High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG). As part of the T-TIP negotiations, a final 
report submitted by U.S. and EU trade officials as part of the HLWG to advise the negotiations recommended that 
the United States and EU seek to establish: 
 an “ambitious ‘SPS-Plus’ chapter, including establishing an ongoing mechanism for improved dialogue and 
cooperation” to address bilateral SPS issues by building on key principles of the WTO SPS agreement, including 
“requirements that each side’s SPS measures be based on science and on international standards or scientific risk 
assessments, applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health, and 
developed in a transparent manner, without undue delay,” and  
 an “ambitious ‘TBT-Plus’ chapter, building on horizontal disciplines in the WTO [TBT Agreement], including 
establishing an ongoing mechanism for improved dialogue and cooperation for addressing bilateral TBT issues,” 
including the goals of “greater openness, transparency, and convergence in regulatory approaches and 
requirements and related standards-development processes ... to reduce redundant and burdensome testing and 
certification requirements, promote confidence in our respective conformity assessment bodies, and enhance 
cooperation on conformity assessment and standardization issues globally.” 
SPS-Plus provisions maintain core WTO SPS principles while strengthening and elaborating requirements regarding 
risk assessment and management, reinforcing the agreement’s least-trade-restrictive principle, promoting trade-
facilitating measures (e.g., equivalence, mutual recognition), and enhancing transparency and notification requirements. 
SPS-Plus provisions would also be fully enforceable and add some form of rapid response mechanism to facilitate 
trade (discussed further in the following section).  
Source: HLWG, “Final Report of the U.S.-EU High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth,” February 11, 2013. 
See also S. Morris, “SPS and TBT Plus: Building upon the WTO in Dependable Ways,” USDEC, May 23, 2017; and 
U.S. Grains Council, “SPS Mechanisms in TPP Agreement a Win for U.S. Agriculture,” press release, October 29, 
2015. 
U.S. industry groups favorably regard SPS-Plus provisions. The concluded TPP agreement 
included commitments on SPS and TBT rules that many in the U.S. agricultural community say 
generally address U.S. concerns and should be regarded as a blueprint for any subsequent 
negotiations involving SPS issues in agricultural trade.135 As outlined by USTR, the TPP 
countries agreed to a series of changes that address specific concerns, including:  
 allowances for public comment on proposed SPS measures to inform 
decisionmaking and to ensure that exporters understand the rules they will need 
to follow,  
 assurances that import programs be risk-based and that import checks are carried 
out without undue delay,  
 improvements in information exchange related to equivalency or regionalization 
requests, 
                                                 
134 Comments by House Ways and Means subcommittee Chairman Devin Nunes, “Hearing on U.S.-EU Trade and 
Investment Partnership Negotiation,” May 16, 2013. See also S. Morris, “SPS and TBT Plus: Building upon the WTO 
in Dependable Ways,” USDEC, May 23, 2013. 
135 Comments by industry representatives at a GBD Colloquium, May 25, 2017. 
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 promotion of “systems-based audits to assess the effectiveness of regulatory 
controls” of the exporting country, and  
 establishment of a mechanism for consultations between governments.136  
But support for SPS-Plus is not universal. Some groups claim that efforts to modify SPS rules are 
an attempt to dismantle food safety regulations that some food companies view as impediments to 
trade and production.137 Some further assert that the TPP’s SPS chapter should not be a blueprint 
for FTAs. They contend that such changes would “further weaken and possibly conflict with 
global standards setting bodies on food and plant safety.”138 
An ITC analysis concluded that the TPP’s SPS provisions “would likely benefit U.S. firms 
exporting food and agriculture products to all TPP members.”139 ITC also reports that, despite 
some opposition to the agreement’s SPS provisions, most comments from agricultural interests 
were supportive of the SPS provisions in TPP. Industry representatives also widely supported the 
cooperative technical consultation process and the ability to have recourse to dispute settlement 
under the dispute resolution chapter for SPS measures.  
Ensuring SPS Enforcement 
Many have been frustrated by ongoing and protracted disputes between the United States and its 
NAFTA partners regarding trade in some agricultural commodities. Disputes involving the 
application SPS and TBT measures, such as import licensing and certification requirements, also 
invoke trade concerns regarding the application of domestic subsidy programs, which were 
explicitly not addressed in the agreement. 
In addition to seeking greater transparency and more timely notifications than currently required 
by the WTO, other hoped-for improvements under SPS-Plus and TBT-Plus provisions are some 
form of “rapid response mechanism” (RRM) to improve the application of SPS and TBT 
measures. The ultimate goal is to adopt enforcement mechanisms or a dispute settlement process 
and to quickly resolve stoppages of agricultural products at the border. 
Many are also advocating for additional enforceability regarding SPS measures and mechanisms 
to more rapidly address disputes.140 Whereas SPS-Plus means trade agreements would contain 
SPS rules and disciplines for agricultural trade that go beyond the WTO, SPS enforceability 
would further ensure that provisions in these trade agreements would have their “own self-
                                                 
136 USTR, “Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,” October 4, 2015. The agreement’s SPS provisions 
are in Chapter 7 (Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures) at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Sanitary-
and-Phytosanitary-Measures.pdf. 
137 See, for example, Center for Food Safety, “Trade Matters: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)—
Impacts on Food and Farming,” May 2014. 
138 Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, “The TPP SPS Chapter: Not a ‘Model for the Rest of the World,’” 
November 12, 2015; and Food and Water Watch, “The TPP Attack on Commonsense Food Safety Standards,” 
December 2015. 
139 ITC, “Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors,” 
Pub. No: 4607, Inv. No.: TPA-105-001, May 2016.  
140 North American Export Grain Association, “Rapid Response Mechanism Supported by Agriculture Trade 
Associations and Companies to Enhance Implementation of Risk Management and Enforcement of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade,” press release, November 2012; and C. Perkins, “U.S. Calls 
for Rapid Response on Agricultural Trade Barriers,” Global Meat News, March 13, 2013. 
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contained SPS enforcement mechanisms that would be much quicker than the WTO dispute 
settlement process.”141  
Under TPP, there was agreement “to improve information exchange related to equivalency or 
regionalization requests and to promote systems-based audits to assess the effectiveness of 
regulatory controls” of the exporting country. In addition, there was agreement “to establish a 
mechanism for consultations between governments” in an effort to “rapidly resolve SPS 
matters.142 Some, however, claim that RRM is an attempt to push potentially unsafe food into 
consumer markets.143 
Addressing Outstanding Trade Disputes 
Some regard NAFTA renegotiations as a way to help resolve long-standing trade disputes 
between the partner countries for a range of sensitive agricultural products such as beef, pork, 
poultry, dairy, rice, and fruits and vegetables. Many have expressed the need to address ongoing 
concerns regarding milk and cheese,144 potatoes, and wine.145 Such disputes often involve the 
application of SPS and TBT measures but also the application of domestic agricultural subsidy 
programs in the partner countries that were explicitly not addressed in NAFTA. 
USTR regularly reports on a range of ongoing trade concerns in its annual National Trade 
Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE) report, which covers trade barriers affecting 
both agricultural and non-food items between the United States and its trading partners, including 
Canada and Mexico. Reported outstanding trade disputes are those that are being addressed either 
through the WTO or NAFTA secretariat, while others may be addressed through other forms of 
dispute resolution, including government and industry negotiations or technical assistance.  
The 2017 NTE report highlights certain outstanding issues involving SPS and TBT issues 
between the United States and Mexico, among which are:146 
 Mexico’s risk assessment requirements affecting unpasteurized commercial milk 
exports from the United States;  
 Mexico’s pest quarantine of stone fruit (peach, nectarine, and apricot) growers in 
California, Georgia, South Carolina, and the Pacific Northwest;  
 Mexico’s pest quarantine requirements prohibiting the shipment of U.S. fresh 
potatoes beyond a 26-kilometer zone along the U.S.-Mexico border; and  
 Mexico’s administrative procedures and customs practices, including insufficient 
prior notification of procedural changes, inconsistent interpretation of regulatory 
                                                 
141 Testimony by James Grueff, “Hearing on U.S.-EU Trade and Investment Partnership Negotiation,” May 16, 2013. 
142 USTR, “Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,” October 4, 2015. 
143 Food and Water Watch, “The TPP Attack on Commonsense Food Safety Standards,” December 2015. See also 
Inside U.S. Trade, “Stakeholders Differ on U.S. Impact of TPP’s ‘Rapid Response Mechanism,’” February 14, 2016. 
The agreement’s TPP provisions can be found in Article 7.11 (paragraphs 6-8) of the SPS text (https://ustr.gov/sites/
default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Sanitary-and-Phytosanitary-Measures.pdf). 
144 Letter to USDA Secretary Perdue and USTR Lighthizer from Senate Agriculture Committee leadership, May 16, 
2017. See also letter to President Trump from several Members of Congress, April 26, 2017; letter to President Trump 
from the U.S. dairy industry, January 11, 2017; and National Milk Producers Federation press release, April 27, 2017. 
145 Inside U.S. Trade, “Washington’s Governor Sees Agricultural Opportunity in NAFTA Renegotiation,” May 23, 
2017. 
146 USTR, 2017 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. Previously SPS were reported in USTR’s 
annual Report on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, which was last issued in 2014. 
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requirements at different border posts, and uneven enforcement of Mexican 
standards and labeling rules. 
For Canada, the 2017 NTE report highlights a number of U.S. concerns over agricultural 
products, some of which have been notified to the WTO:  
 Canada’s restrictions on the sale, advertising, or importation of seed varieties that 
are not registered in the prescribed manner;  
 Canada’s cheese compositional standards that limit the amount of dry milk 
protein concentrate (MPC) that can be used in cheese making, restricting access 
of certain U.S. dairy products to the Canadian market;  
 Canada’s practice of supply management systems regulating its dairy, chicken, 
turkey, and egg industries involving production quotas, producer marketing 
boards to regulate price and supply, and TRQs;  
 U.S. concerns involving Canada’s concessions to the EU as part of its trade 
agreement involving GIs, which may restrict the sale of certain U.S. products to 
Canada;  
 Restrictions on U.S. grain exports due to Canadian statutory grades, which are 
reserved exclusively for grains grown in Canada;  
 Restrictions within Canadian provinces that restrict the sale of wine, beer, and 
spirits through province-run liquor control boards; and  
 Canadian restrictions involving trade in softwood lumber.  
In addition, the United States has also brought other cases against Canada147 and Mexico148 within 
the WTO.  
Not listed here are any perceived trade barriers to Mexican or Canadian agricultural exports to the 
United States, according to authorities in those countries. 
The text box (below) further discusses two high-profile trade disputes between the United States 
and its NAFTA partners. 
                                                 
147 Other WTO SPS cases brought by the United States against Canada include DS520 (Measures Governing the Sale 
of Wine in Grocery Stores), DS338 (Provisional Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Grain), DS276 
(Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain), DS170 (Term of Patent Protection), and 
DS103 (Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products). This list does not include 
cases brought against the United States by Canada. 
148 Other WTO SPS cases brought by the United States against Mexico include DS101 and DS132 (Anti-Dumping 
Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup [HFCS]), DS203 (Measures Affecting Trade in Live Swine), DS295 
(Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice), and DS308 (Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other 
Beverages). This list does not include cases brought against the United States by Mexico. 
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Selected Commodity-Specific U.S. Disputes Involving Canada and Mexico 
U.S. Ultra-Filtered Milk Exports to Canada  
Canada’s supply management system for its dairy sector—a regime that supports milk prices at high levels relative to 
world market prices though quotas on domestic production together with high tariff levels and TRQs that restrict 
imports of dairy products—has long been a source of concern for the U.S. dairy industry. Currently, U.S. dairy 
interests are concerned about an ingredient pricing strategy the Canadian dairy industry is pursuing, designated as 
Class 7. U.S. interests assert that this pricing strategy is intended to further discourage imports of certain U.S. milk 
products to Canada, including ultra-filtered milk, in favor of Canadian dairy products while also facilitating exports of 
Canadian skim milk products beyond their allowable WTO commitments. An additional concern for the U.S. dairy 
industry is that Canadian dairy farmers and some Canadian officials refer to U.S. exports of diafiltered milk as being a 
product that is distinct from ultra-filtered milk.  
U.S. dairy interests contend that Canada’s program is designed to favor Canadian milk products at the expense of 
imports. They also assert that the Class 7 initiative will facilitate dumping of Canadian skim milk ingredients on world 
markets. In a September 2016 letter to government trade officials, major U.S. dairy market stakeholders—together 
with their counterparts in several dairy-exporting competitor countries—contended that the Canadian dairy 
industry's ingredients pricing program that was agreed to in principle (the basis for Class 7) violates Canada's 
commitments under NAFTA, the WTO, and the EU-Canada CETA. In an April 2017 letter, Canada's ambassador to 
the United States rejected assertions that Canada's dairy policies are causing financial loss for U.S. dairy farmers and 
that they violate Canada's international trade obligations, asserting that the U.S. dairy industry is more protectionist 
than is Canada's. The ambassador further points out that the Class 7 National Ingredient Strategy is an industry 
initiative representing an agreement among Canada's dairy producers and processors. Separately, Canadian dairy 
industry officials contend that the dilemma facing U.S. farmers whose supply contracts are not being extended reflects 
excess U.S. milk production, not Canada's dairy pricing policies.  
In a letter dated April 13, 2017, U.S. dairy industry groups requested that President Trump intervene directly with 
Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to halt the Class 7 program. In addition, several Members of Congress from 
Minnesota have asked President Trump to explore whether Class 7 pricing violates Canada's WTO obligations. In a 
recent speech, President Trump vowed to “stand up" for Wisconsin dairy farmers. Renegotiating NAFTA could 
provide a construct for addressing Canada's dairy ingredient pricing strategy. 
For more information, see CRS Report R43905, Major Agricultural Trade Issues in the 115th Congress; and CRS Insight 
IN10692, New Canadian Dairy Pricing Regime Proves Disruptive for U.S. Milk Producers. For information on other disputes, 
see CRS Report R44851, The 2006 U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Agreement (SLA): In Brief.  
 
Mexico’s Prohibitions on U.S. Fresh Potatoes 
Mexico continues to prohibit the shipment of U.S. fresh potatoes beyond a 26-kilometer zone along the U.S.-Mexico 
border, despite a series of attempts to address this issue. In 2003, the United States and Mexico signed the Table 
Stock Potato Access Agreement. The agreement provided a process for allowing U.S. potatoes access to all of Mexico 
over a three-year period. However, Mexico did not implement the agreement, citing pest detections in U.S. potato 
shipments—thus invoking SPS and related trade measures in this case. In 2011, the North American Plant Protection 
Organization released a report identifying six pests that Mexico should consider quarantine pests in potatoes for 
consumption. Both the United States and Mexico agreed to the report and its recommendations. In May 2014, 
Mexico published new import regulations for potatoes in the Diario Oficial (the official journal of the government of 
Mexico). These new regulations would allow the importation of U.S. potatoes into any part of Mexico. The Mexican 
Potato Industry Association (CONPAPA) challenged the new import regulations in Mexican courts. In July 2016, 
Mexican authorities issued decrees to reinstate U.S. fresh potato access to areas beyond the 26-kilometer border 
zone, superseding the 2014 regulations issued by Mexico’s Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, 
Fisheries and Food (SAGARPA) that CONPAPA had blocked with a series of court injunctions. CONPAPA then 
sought and obtained from Mexican courts three new injunctions against these decrees. USDA, USTR, and SAGARPA, 
in consultation with their respective potato industries, continue to work on ways to resolve this case. Meanwhile, 
U.S. potato growers are supporting NAFTA renegotiation to further address this and related SPS issues, which they 
recommend be addressed in a manner similar to how SPS was addressed in the TPP agreement. 
Source: USTR, 2017 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers; and B. Thomson, “U.S. Potato Farmers 
Still Smarting From Soured Deal with Mexico,” Agri-Pulse, February 28, 2017. 
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Dispute Settlement Under NAFTA 
Unlike other U.S. FTAs, NAFTA contains a binational dispute settlement mechanism (Chapter 
19) to review AD and CVD decisions of a domestic administrative body. Canada and Mexico 
sought this provision in NAFTA as a check on what they considered unfair AD/CVD decisions 
from U.S. administrative agencies. Under Chapter 19, a dispute settlement panel chosen from a 
trinational roster reviews any AD and CVD determinations that are not satisfactorily settled. 
Some have called for the elimination of Chapter 19. For example, Senator Ron Wyden, ranking 
Member of the Senate Finance Committee, has repeatedly indicated that NAFTA renegotiation 
should include the “elimination of Chapter 19 of the NAFTA, which enables Canada and Mexico 
to challenge the way that the U.S. addresses unfairly traded imports from those countries.”149 This 
concern stems largely from the long-standing U.S.-Canada softwood lumber dispute regarding 
allegedly dumped and subsidized lumber from Canada.150 In these cases, the panels have often 
found fault with U.S. administrative decisions, which often resulted in the reduction of AD/CVD 
rates.  
Some U.S. stakeholders view Chapter 19 as unlawful151 and express concerns about whether an 
extrajudicial body should be able to review U.S. AD and CVD decisions. Senator Wyden said he 
has received assurances from the Trump Administration that NAFTA renegotiation will consider 
concerns regarding Chapter 19152 and also “look to improve on what was achieved in the TPP 
agreement.”153 However, Canada and Mexico are expected to seek to retain the chapter. 
While FTA partners seek to resolve disputes without resorting to dispute settlement through 
consultation, mediation, and negotiation, U.S. FTAs, including NAFTA, contain a formal dispute 
settlement mechanism (Chapter 20). These mechanisms are rarely used, as a preponderance of 
cases are brought to WTO dispute settlement. Three cases have been decided under NAFTA 
dispute settlement. If NAFTA were renegotiated to contain provisions not in the WTO body of 
agreements, dispute settlement under NAFTA could be used with greater frequency. Some 
contend that TPP may provide a model for any reworking of NAFTA’s dispute resolution 
provisions. TPP provided for dispute resolution and contained additional disciplines. These 
included transparency, cooperation and alternative mechanisms (such as consultation), formal 
consultations and panel review within specified time frames, composition of panels, functioning 
and integrity of panels, private rights of action, and panel reporting.154 TPP also addressed panel 
report implementation to maximize compliance to the agreed obligations. It also encouraged the 
use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms with respect to private commercial disputes. 
                                                 
149 Senator Ron Wyden, “Wyden Statement on NAFTA Renegotiation Notice,” press release, May 18, 2017; and 
comments by Senator Wyden during a Senate Finance Committee hearing, “The President’s Trade Policy Agenda and 
Fiscal Year 2018 Budget,” June 21, 2017. 
150 For more information, see CRS Report R42789, Softwood Lumber Imports from Canada: Current Issues; and CRS 
Report R44851, The 2006 U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Trade Agreement (SLA): In Brief. 
151 G. Gagné and M. Paulin, “The Softwood Lumber Dispute and US Allegations of Improper NAFTA Panel Review,” 
American Review of Canadian Studies, vol. 43, issue 3 (September 6, 2013). 
152 Inside U.S. Trade, “Wyden: Administration ‘Committed’ to Doing Away with NAFTA’s Chapter 19,” May 17, 
2017. 
153 Wyden, “Wyden Statement on NAFTA Renegotiation Notice.” 
154 USTR, “TPP Fact Sheets: Dispute Settlement,” October 2015.  
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Addressing Geographical Indications 
GIs are geographical names that act to protect the quality and reputation of a distinctive product 
originating in a certain region. The term is most often applied to wines, spirits, and agricultural 
products. Some food producers benefit from the use of GIs by giving certain foods recognition for 
their distinctiveness, differentiating them from other foods in the marketplace. In this manner, GIs 
can be commercially valuable. GIs may also be eligible for relief from acts of infringement or 
unfair competition. The use of GIs may also protect consumers from deceptive or misleading 
labels. Most examples of registered or established GIs cover certain food products from the EU, 
such as Parmigiano Reggiano cheese and Prosciutto di Parma ham from the Parma region of Italy, 
Roquefort cheese, Champagne from the region of the same name in France, and Irish Whiskey.155 
Examples of GIs from the United States include Florida oranges, Idaho potatoes, Vidalia onions, 
Washington State apples, and Napa Valley Wines. 
The U.S. dairy industry is raising GIs as a potential NAFTA renegotiation issue because of 
protections afforded to registered products in third-country markets following a series of recently 
concluded trade agreements between the EU and countries such as Canada, South Korea, South 
Africa, and other countries that are, in many cases, also major trading partners with the United 
States.156 Specifically, provisions in these agreements may provide full protection of GIs and not 
defer to a country’s independent assessment of generic status for key product names. For 
example, the EU-Canada CETA reportedly recognizes the GI status of up to 200 EU GIs for milk 
and dairy products.157 Similar types of GI protections are reportedly also in other FTAs between 
the EU and other countries, affecting a range of food products and wine.158 In addition to facing 
trade restrictions for U.S. products in the EU market, these protections may limit the future sale 
of U.S. exported products bearing such names to these third countries, regardless of whether the 
United States may have been exporting such products carrying a generic name for years.  
Mexico and Canada do not have GIs registered under the EU’s GI program.159 However, each 
country could offer third-country protections to EU-registered GIs that could restrict U.S. exports 
of similar products to Mexico and Canada—as were recently negotiated in the EU-Canada CETA.  
GIs have been a contentious area of debate between the United States and EU in the T-TIP 
negotiation.160 Laws and regulations governing GIs differ markedly between the United States 
and EU, which further complicates this issue.  
The EU and Canada have completed negotiations on the EU-Canada CETA.161 The European 
Parliament approved CETA in February 2017, but Canada has not yet ratified it. Were the EU and 
Canada to fully implement CETA, the roughly 200 EU GIs for milk and dairy products 
recognized under the agreement could result in some U.S. dairy products being blocked from 
                                                 
155 For more background information, see CRS Report R44556, Geographical Indications (GIs) in U.S. Food and 
Agricultural Trade.  
156 Comments by S. Morris, USDEC, at a GBD Colloquium, May 25, 2017. 
157 See, for example, National Milk Producers Federation, “U.S. Dairy Industry Decries Market Barriers Raised in EU-
Canada Trade Deal,” September 29, 2014. 
158 See, for example, USDA, “South Africa: Proposed Protection of Geographical Indications in South Africa,” GAIN 
Report, August 29, 2014. 
159 For a listing of GIs, see European Commission, DOOR database, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/
list.html. 
160 For more background information, see CRS Report R44564, Agriculture and the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (T-TIP) Negotiations. 
161 For information, see the EU’s website: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/canada/. 
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export to Canada. The EU and Mexico launched negotiations in May 2016 to modernize their 
existing Global Agreement, including rules on trade. Were the EU-Mexico trade agreement to 
include similar provisions to CETA regarding GIs for milk and dairy products, this could 
similarly block some U.S. dairy products from export to Mexico.162  
GIs were also among the agricultural issues that have been addressed in the TPP agreement, 
resulting in additional commitments, and so could be considered as part of NAFTA 
renegotiation.163 The TPP agreement obligates members that provide for recognition of GIs to 
make this process available and transparent to interested parties within the TPP while also 
providing a process for canceling GI protection. Parties that recognize GIs also to adopt a 
procedure by which interested parties may object to the provision of a GI before it is officially 
recognized. Among the reasons the agreement lists for opposing a GI are (1) the GI is likely to 
cause confusion with a trademark that is recognized within the country, (2) a pre-existing 
application is pending, or (3) the GI is the customary term for the same item in the common 
language of a country.  
Concerning other international agreements involving TPP members that provide for the protection 
of GIs, the TPP agreement states that members are to make available to interested parties 
information concerning the GIs involved in other agreements and to allow them a reasonable 
opportunity to comment on, and to oppose, the prospective recognition of the GIs. These 
obligations would not apply to international agreements that were concluded, agreed in principle, 
or ratified or that had entered into force prior to the entry into force of the TPP agreement. 
GIs are an example of intellectual property rights (IPR), along with other types of intellectual 
property such as patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. The use of GIs has become a 
contentious international trade issue, particularly for U.S. wine, cheese, and sausage makers. In 
general, some consider GIs to be protected intellectual property, while others consider them to be 
generic or semi-generic terms. GIs are included among other IPR issues in the current U.S. trade 
agenda.164 GIs are protected by the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), which sets binding minimum standards for IP protection that are 
enforceable by the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure. Under TRIPS, WTO members must 
recognize and protect GIs as intellectual property.  
Next Steps 
Following the Administration’s formal notification to Congress of its intent to renegotiate 
NAFTA in May 2017,165 and assuming a 90-day consultation period for Congress, NAFTA 
negotiations could begin as soon as mid-to-late August. Prior to that, the Administration would 
need to outline and submit its negotiating objectives to Congress by mid-to-late July. USTR is 
scheduled to conduct a public hearing on June 27, 2017, for which it has requested public 
comment on “matters relevant to the modernization” of NAFTA. It is seeking public input on a 
range of issues, including general and product-specific negotiating objectives, economic costs and 
benefits to U.S. producers and consumers of removing any remaining tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers, treatment of specific goods, customs and trade facilitation issues, trade remedy issues, 
                                                 
162 For information, see the EU’s website: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/mexico/. 
163 CRS Report R44337, TPP: American Agriculture and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement. 
164 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10033, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and International Trade. 
165 Letter to top legislators in both congressional chambers from USTR Robert Lighthizer, May 18, 2017. See also CRS 
Insight IN10706, North American Free Trade Agreement: Notification for Renegotiation.  
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and any unwarranted SPS measures and technical barriers to trade, among other issues.166 ITC’s 
analysis—requested by the Administration—to assess the probable economic effects of 
eliminating U.S. tariffs for “import sensitive agricultural products” is also scheduled to be 
released around that time. The Administration’s forthcoming negotiating objectives, USTR’s 
review of submitted public comments and testimony at its June hearing, and ITC’s forthcoming 
analysis could all help inform the renegotiation process. 
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